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1 
Articles 
RACIAL INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND 
SEGREGATION IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Michelle Adams* 
“Racial isolation” itself is not a harm; only state-enforced segregation 
is.1 
A compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation, an interest that 
a school district, in its discretion and expertise, may choose to pursue.2 
INTRODUCTION 
For more than a generation, much of the legal scholarship 
concerning the underpinnings and aims of the equal protection 
clause has centered on a debate between “anti-subordination” 
and “anti-classification” or “anti-differentiation.” For some time, 
these twin themes have animated the discussion about equal 
protection law. On the anti-classification or anti-differentiation 
view, the equal protection clause protects against government 
action that classifies on the basis of race or that otherwise 
differentiates on the basis of race.3 An anti-classification view 
emphasizes discrimination, and is primarily concerned with 
individual versus group rights, and the particular motivations of 
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 1. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 122 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 2. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 797 
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 3. PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 963 (5th ed. 2006) (the ‘anti-classification’ approach “prohibits 
certain kinds of classifications, which are assumed by their nature to be invidious.”); 
Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1003, 1005 (1986) (arguing that under the “anti-differentiation perspective, it is 
inappropriate to treat individuals differently on the basis of a particular normative view 
about race or sex”). 
!!!ADAMS-281-RACIAL INCLUSION2.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 5/31/2012  12:04 PM 
2 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 28:1 
 
the government actor in taking the complained-of action.4 The 
anti-classification or anti-differentiation perspective has largely 
been associated with a narrower interpretation of the equal 
protection clause, one that would tend to reject affirmative 
action programs. 
On the other hand, the anti-subordination view emphasizes 
that the equal protection clause protects against government 
action which “helps sustain or reinforce unjust forms of social 
hierarchy or social subordination.”5 The anti-subordination view 
emphasizes groups rather than individuals, is concerned with 
social status and racial hierarchies and argues that the equal 
protection clause should be interpreted to prevent an unjust 
social structure.6 The anti-subordination view has largely been 
associated with a broader interpretation of the scope of the 
equal protection clause, one that would countenance affirmative 
action schemes. 
However, the Court has never explicitly articulated its 
acceptance of the anti-subordination approach. On the other 
hand, the Court has expressly adopted the anti-classification 
view and it refers to the need to root out racial classification 
schemes routinely in equal protection cases.7 To be sure, many of 
the Court’s cases can be explained by reference to anti-
subordination values.8 But only in the few instances where the 
Court has spoken directly to the evils of “white supremacy”9 or 
explained how racially separate public schools create feelings “of 
inferiority as to their status in the community”10 do we have 
more direct evidence of the Court’s adoption of an anti-
subordination approach. 
Conversely, the Court has often spoken explicitly about the 
evils of racial segregation as distinct from the harms associated 
with racial classification schemes. In some contexts, the Court 
 
 4. Colker, supra note 3, at 1005 (describing the anti-differentiation view as an in-
dividual rights perspective because it “focuses on the motivation of the individual 
institution that has allegedly discriminated, without attention to the larger societal 
context in which the institution operates,” and, second, because it “focuses on the specific 
effect of the alleged discrimination on discrete individuals, rather than on groups”). 
 5. BREST ET AL., supra note 3. 
 6. See id. 
 7. See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: 
Anti-Classification or Anti-Subordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 13 (2003) (arguing 
that “antisubordination values have played and continue to play a key role in shaping 
what the anticlassification principle means in practice”). 
 8. See id. at 11–12. 
 9. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 (1967). 
 10. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
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has acknowledged that segregation operates as a particularly 
effective mechanism of exclusion, separating individuals on the 
basis of race and preventing them from having access to 
opportunity. Supreme Court doctrine suggests that the Court 
“cares” about racial segregation because it is a strong marker for 
exclusion. Has the Court always displayed concern about 
segregation as a mechanism of exclusion? No. Segregation’s 
status and constitutional relevance is the subject of great debate 
on the Court. But the Court’s view of segregation has not been 
monolithic. This Article argues that the Court has evidenced far 
more concern about de facto segregation as an exclusionary and 
stigmatizing mechanism than many scholars and commentators 
recognize. As it turns out, a very specific type of anti-
subordination value often animates the Court’s equal protection 
jurisprudence: a concern about the corrosive effects of de facto 
racial segregation. 
This argument is not just of historical import. Instead, the 
Court’s perception of the harms of segregation will play a large 
role in determining the continuing constitutional vitality of 
affirmative action in higher education. Indeed, the Court is 
poised to revisit its decision in Grutter v. Bollinger,11 which 
upheld the University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative 
action program. In a recent and widely followed case, Fisher v. 
University of Texas,12 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit relied upon Grutter to uphold the University of 
Texas’ affirmative action program against a constitutional 
challenge.13 But in a special concurrence, Judge Emilio M. Garza 
urged the Supreme Court to overturn its decision in Grutter v. 
Bollinger.14 The Court has granted certiorari in Fisher and the 
ultimate outcome will almost certainly hinge on whether the 
Court still believes that affirmative action programs serve 
broadly inclusive, non-segregative ends or whether such pro-
grams are simply so divisive that they cannot comport with the 
equal protection clause. 
In Part I of the Article, I examine early cases in which the 
Court described segregation as a form of resource “lock-up.” In 
several cases leading up to Brown, the Court detailed how racial 
segregation allows a more dominant group to hoard substantial 
 
 11. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 12. 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 1652 (U.S. Feb. 21, 
2012) (No. 11-345). 
 13. Id. at 217. 
 14. Id. at 247 (Garza, J., concurring). 
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societal resources. In these early cases, the Court’s focus was on 
segregation as a mechanism for excluding individuals from 
valuable benefits on the basis of race; it did not speak explicitly 
to the harms associated with racial classification schemes. In this 
Part of the Article, I also return to Brown v. Board of Education 
and explore the Court’s discussion of segregation and its link to 
psychological harm and status diminution. As in several of the 
cases leading up to Brown, the Court does not speak explicitly to 
the evils of racial classification schemes. Brown still stands as a 
sharp critique of the evils of segregation. 
In Part II, I explore how the Court has sometimes used de 
facto segregation as evidence of de jure discrimination in school 
districts that had been (but were no longer) segregated by law. 
In the South at least, the fact of segregation in the public schools 
triggered an affirmative duty to desegregate even when the 
public school districts were not necessarily responsible for that 
segregation. In this Part, I also trace Brown’s journey North. I 
offer an interpretation of Milliken v. Bradley II,15 which 
emphasizes the Court’s deep discomfort with segregation and 
links its dismay with the social stratification and racial stigma 
associated with segregation. This Part ends with a reading of the 
Court’s later Brown implementation cases, which refused to 
adopt Justice Thomas’ narrow view of the meaning of 
“segregation.” 
In Part III, I shift to the voting rights context and discuss 
how the Court in Shaw v. Reno16 viewed a districting scheme 
which explicitly segregated voters by race into separate electoral 
districts as a particularly virulent form of racial classification. In 
Shaw, the Court is concerned not just with racial classification 
schemes that infect the political process, but it is also concerned 
with how racial segregation undermines the political process. As 
I explain, Shaw’s central claim is that segregation, not just racial 
classification schemes, harms the polity. The lesson of Parts I, II 
and III of this Article is that while the Court’s understanding 
and concern about segregation is often contradictory and 
dismissive, it is also far more nuanced than commonly 
appreciated. Segregation can “move” the Court when it 
explicitly stands as a marker of exclusion. 
 
 15. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). 
 16. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
!!!ADAMS-281-RACIAL INCLUSION2.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 5/31/2012  12:04 PM 
2012] RACIAL INCLUSION 5 
 
Finally, in Part IV, I discuss Grutter v. Bollinger.17 In 
Grutter, the Court held that the government could use racial 
classifications to enhance racial diversity. Grutter embraced 
racial integration as a mode of facilitating racial inclusion. 
Grutter has links to previous cases in which the Court 
demonstrated a deep and abiding concern about the stigmatizing 
and racially exclusionary aspects of segregation. But in Parents 
Involved, the Court appeared to step back from Grutter’s more 
enthusiastic endorsement of racial integration. Grutter’s 
continuing viability will turn on whether the Court views 
affirmative action as playing a divisive, balkanizing and 
exclusionary role in American life or instead on whether the 
Court sees affirmative action as playing a broad inclusionary and 
desegregative role in American life.18 
I. SEGREGATION AND RESOURCE “LOCK-UPS” 
At various points, the Court has characterized segregation 
as a form of exclusion. In several cases decided prior to Brown, 
the Court described the harm associated with segregation as a 
type of “resource lock-up.” Take McLaurin v. Oklahoma State 
Regents for Higher Education.19 In McLaurin, a student was 
admitted to a state graduate program in education, but 
segregated from his peers within the school.20 Rather than focus 
on the harm created by the state’s classification scheme which 
required intra-school segregation, the Court focused on how 
segregation harmed McLaurin’s ability to study and learn his 
profession.21 The Court noted that the segregation requirement 
“sets McLaurin apart from the other students,”22 which had the 
effect of preventing him from gaining access to a valuable 
resource on the same terms as white students, a doctorate in 
education. 
 
 17. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 18. See Reva Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of 
Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1284 (2011) (arguing that a 
“framework attentive to concerns of balkanization captures concerns moving the center 
of the Court more faithfully than one focused solely on the conventional distinction 
between anticlassification and antisubordination.”). 
 19. 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
 20. Id. at 640. At the time the case was decided, McLaurin was “assigned to a seat 
in the classroom in a row specified for colored students; he is assigned to a table in the 
library on the main floor; and he is permitted to eat at the same time in the cafeteria as 
other students, although here again he is assigned to a special table.” Id. 
 21. Id. at 641. 
 22. Id.  
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Another way of stating this is to suggest that a valuable 
resource, graduate study, was being reserved to members of the 
dominant group and members of the disfavored group were 
excluded from equal access to that resource; McLaurin suggests 
that that resource must be shared.23 Indeed, the Court previewed 
a theme that was to become dominant in Grutter almost three 
generations later: the relationship between higher education and 
societal leadership. The Court observed that as our society grows 
increasingly complex, the “need for trained leaders increases 
correspondingly.”24 The Court asserted that individuals attaining 
advanced degrees would become leaders in their communities 
and trainers of others.25 But McLaurin’s ability to perform this 
vital leadership function would be fatally undermined by a 
racially segregated education.26 
That resource lock-up theme was even more pronounced in 
Sweatt v. Painter.27 In Sweatt, the state of Texas created a 
separate law school for blacks in order to come into compliance 
with the equal protection clause as then interpreted.28 The 
question for the Court was whether the separate black law 
school was “substantially equal” to the all-white University of 
Texas Law School.29 The Court said no, but not just because the 
two schools lacked substantial equality based on the difference 
in the number of books in the library or credentials of the 
teaching staff. To be sure, the Court compared the two 
educational programs with respect to the baseline requirements 
necessary for an adequate legal education: competent faculty, 
course offerings, law library, law review and other extra-
curricular activities. Based upon its comparison of these tangible 
factors alone the Court found that the “University of Texas Law 
 
 23. Along these lines, Daria Roithmayr has described historical racial discrim-
ination from an anti-competitive perspective. See Daria Roithmayr, Racial Cartels, 16 
MICH. J. RACE & L. 45, 48 (2010) (arguing that under a Jim Crow régime all-white 
groups often functioned as racial cartels and “gained significant social, economic and 
political profit—higher wages, higher property values, greater political power—from 
excluding on the basis of race”). 
 24. McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 641. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
 28. Id. at 632. The narrow issue decided by the Court was whether the legal 
education offered to blacks within the state of Texas was “equivalent to that offered by 
the State to students of other races.” Id. at 635. 
 29. Id. at 633–34. 
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School is superior”30 and thus it could have ended its substantial 
equality analysis there. 
But the Court’s analysis continued. Instead, the Court 
measured equality in a more nuanced way. As many com-
mentators have noted, the Court emphasized the “intangible” 
differences between the University of Texas Law School and the 
“new law school for Negroes.”31 The Court’s analysis focused on 
the structural differences between the two educational programs. 
The Court discussed those qualities that “make for greatness in a 
law school.”32 Those qualities were prestige, influence, 
reputation, and traditions, “intangibles” in the sense that they 
resist standard empirical measurement. Stated another way, the 
Court’s analysis focused on how the University of Texas Law 
School provided certain resource and status benefits to white 
students that simply were not available to black students, 
notwithstanding the adequacy of any parallel legal program open 
to them. What is perhaps most important about this line of 
analysis is that the Court had no trouble with the idea that status 
benefits and resources are real rather than imagined, and that 
they provide enormous benefits to white students.33 
Prior to Sweatt, of course, such status benefits had been the 
subject of a “lockup,” meaning that they were reserved solely to 
white students. Again, there is no discussion in the case of the 
harms associated with the state’s racial classification scheme 
which mandated separate education for blacks and whites in 
higher education. Instead, the Court engages in a dissertation on 
the harms associated with segregation, of what happens when a 
dominant group reserves to itself certain kinds of resources and 
benefits solely to individuals on the basis of their race. One 
argument is that those benefits, particularly as the Court 
discussed them in connection with reputation and the strength of 
the school’s alumni, have a “feedback loop” effect. The longer 
the benefit is reserved to white students, the greater the value of 
the benefit, the more societal power is accreted to the dominant 
 
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. at 633. 
 32. Id. at 634. 
 33. Along these lines, see Amy Stuart Wells, The “Consequences” of School 
Desegregation: The Mismatch Between the Research and the Rationale, 28 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 771, 775 (2001) (“The Sweatt and McLaurin decisions rested on the 
negative effect of black students’ exclusion from white institutions not simply because of 
the resources or facilities in these institutions, but also because of their status in society 
as well as the social networks of faculty and students within them.”). 
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group and the more that dominant group becomes identified 
with that benefit.34 
And indeed a secondary theme in Sweatt is the Court’s 
discussion of the negative effects of racial exclusion, the core of 
the harm of segregation. Exclusion from the University of Texas 
Law School harmed black students not just because that 
exclusion is mandated under a scheme that classifies individuals 
on the basis of a phenotypical characteristic. Instead, the black 
law school sets prospective black lawyers apart and is conducted 
in a legal vacuum. It is “removed from the interplay of ideas and 
the exchange of views with which the law is concerned,”35 and 
thus could not adequately prepare black lawyers to function in a 
professional world where interaction with white clients and 
judges was expected. This line of argumentation, of course, 
anticipated the Court’s later discussion of the importance of 
viewpoint diversity in both Bakke and Grutter, but with one key 
difference. In Bakke and Grutter, the Court was willing to look 
at the totality of the law school experience for all law students; 
those cases opined that homogeneity undermines the law school 
experience for everyone. In Sweatt, the Court’s discussion of 
racial exclusion is more specific; how segregated professional 
education harms the ability of black lawyers to do their job. 
Indeed, the Court has made the connection between 
segregation and resource lock-ups outside of the race context. In 
United States v. Virginia,36 the Court considered an equal 
protection challenge to the Virginia Military Institute’s male-
only admissions policy. As in Sweatt, the state created a separate 
program for women in an attempt to come into compliance with 
the equal protection clause.37 But the Court ruled that the 
parallel program, the Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership, 
did not provide a comparable single-gender educational 
experience and thus it did not provide an adequate remedy for 
the underlying constitutional violation.38 The Court’s heavy 
reliance on Sweatt is notable. In analyzing why the VMIL was 
 
 34. For an analysis of how negative feedback loops shape current residential segre-
gation, see Daria Roithmayr, Locked in Segregation, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 197, 197 
(2004) “[During Jim Crow,] white racial cartels . . . engaged in anti-competitive conduct 
to exclude blacks and monopolize access to good neighborhoods.” Roithmayr asserts that 
that advantage has become “locked-in via certain self-reinforcing neighborhoods effects, 
namely through public school finance and neighborhood job referral networks.”). 
 35. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634.  
 36. 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
 37. Id. at 525–26. 
 38. Id. at 552–54. 
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not comparable to VMI, the Court reviewed Sweatt in detail, and 
reiterated the importance of the intangibles in the comparability 
analysis. The entire thrust of the Court’s discussion of VMIL 
centers on the harms associated with exclusion, that is 
segregation not the gender classification scheme itself. The 
problem with the VMIL was that it was not equal to VMI in 
terms of tangibles (course offerings and curricular choices). But 
more importantly VMIL lacked the “faculty stature, funding, 
prestige, alumni support and influence,”39 those things incapable 
of objective measurement.40 
A. SEGREGATION, PSYCHOLOGICAL HARM AND STATUS 
DIMINUTION 
The basis of the Court’s holding in Brown v. Board of 
Education41 has been much debated. The standard and widely 
accepted view is that Brown is open to several varying and 
potentially inconsistent interpretations.42 But there can be little 
doubt that Brown stands for the proposition, at least in part, that 
state-mandated racial segregation violates the equal protection 
clause because it causes psychological harm and sends the 
message that blacks are inferior to whites. The debate, of course, 
centers on the question of whether it is the segregation itself that 
created such harms or the fact that such segregation was 
required by state law. 
My argument here will not end this debate. I will simply 
observe that there is no discussion in Brown of racial 
classification schemes or of the harms that such schemes might 
cause. Instead, the Court explained explicitly how segregation 
creates psychological damage (separation “generates a feeling of 
inferiority” which affects black students’ “hearts and minds”),43 
facilitates status diminution (separation “denot[es] the 
inferiority of the negro group”),44 and excludes blacks from 
educational opportunities afforded only to white students 
(education is the “very foundation of good citizenship” and thus 
“must be made available to all on equal terms”).45 Indeed, the 
 
 39. Id. at 553. 
 40. Id. at 554 (citing Sweatt, 359 U.S. at 634). 
 41. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 42. See, e.g., KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 508–09 (17th ed. 2010) (noting four possible interpretations of Brown: color-
blindness, caste, white supremacy and integration).  
 43. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. at 493.  
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Court implied that racial segregation even in the absence of state 
compunction causes harm, “‘segregation of white and colored 
children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the 
colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of 
the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually 
interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group.”46 
Bolling v. Sharpe47 dealt with the constitutionality of racial 
segregation in the District of Columbia public schools, therefore 
the equal protection clause did not apply.48 In Bolling, the Court 
articulated a theme that had been absent in Brown and which 
was to take on increasing importance: that racial classification 
schemes are inherently suspect and thus should receive some 
form of heightened scrutiny.49 But while Bolling articulated the 
idea that a heightened level of judicial review ought to apply to 
racial classification schemes, it is not clear that the Court 
actually applied that standard to the race-based segregation 
scheme at issue. Instead, the Court stated that segregation “in 
public education is not reasonably related to any proper 
governmental objective, and thus imposes on Negro children of 
the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary 
deprivation of their liberty . . . .”50 This wording is strange if what 
the Court was doing was applying something approaching strict 
scrutiny review to a racial classification scheme. The language 
instead seems to be more consistent with the application of 
“rational basis” or a more deferential standard of review. 
If that is the case, why was segregation not reasonably 
related to any proper governmental objective? Surely the 
government could argue that the need to segregate the races is 
rationally related to some legitimate government objective, such 
as protecting the public health or welfare.51 It is not clear exactly 
why the Court rejects this view, but one answer seems to lie in 
Brown. In Bolling, the Court simply says it would be 
“unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser 
 
 46. Id. at 494 (emphasis supplied). 
 47. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 48. Id. at 499. Bolling has typically been explained as an example of “reverse 
incorporation” with the Court incorporating the obligations of the equal protection 
clause as against the federal government through the due process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. See BREST ET AL., supra note 3, at 915. 
 49. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499 (“Classifications based solely upon race must be 
scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence 
constitutionally suspect.”). 
 50. Id. at 500. 
 51. See Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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duty on the Federal Government.”52 If we are to assume that the 
due process and equal protection clauses impose similar duties 
on the states and the federal government, the Court’s primary 
explication of that duty comes out of Brown. And as discussed 
above, there is good reason to believe that the Brown Court was 
independently concerned about the harms of segregation and its 
negative impact on African-Americans. In this sense, the Bolling 
Court incorporates Brown’s reasoning as against the federal 
government as well. 
II. DE FACTO SEGREGATION AS EVIDENCE OF DE 
JURE DISCRIMINATION 
The Court has also used segregation as evidence of de jure 
discrimination. Take Green v. New Kent County School Board.53 
That case concerned the question of whether a formerly de jure 
segregated school system’s adoption of a freedom of choice plan 
allowing black and white students to choose which school to 
attend impermissibly perpetuated an unconstitutional dual 
school system.54 In Green, the Court ruled that school districts 
formerly operating dual school systems have an affirmative duty 
“to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a 
unitary system in which racial discrimination would be 
eliminated root and branch.”55 The Court found that the freedom 
of choice plan was ineffective because even after three years of 
operation “85% of the Negro children in the system still attend 
the all-Negro Watkins school.”56 The thrust of the Court’s ruling 
was that New Kent County was still operating a dual school 
system and thus was in violation of Brown because the schools 
were racially monolithic. This was the case even though the state 
law no longer required that the schools be racially segregated. 
Green is famous for the “affirmative duty” doctrine and it 
put to rest the idea that school districts had no obligation to take 
affirmative steps to desegregate their school systems. Under 
Green, Brown I plus Brown II equals the requirement to 
transition to a “racially nondiscriminatory school system.”57 But 
under the logic of Green, a racially nondiscriminatory school 
system could not include a system where 85% of the black 
 
 52. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500. 
 53. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
 54. Id. at 431–32. 
 55. Id. at 437–38. 
 56. Id. at 441. 
 57. Id. at 437. 
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children still attended the same school they had attended prior 
to the Brown decision. Under Green, the remedy for state 
imposed segregation is desegregation, and the evidence of 
whether the school district had come into compliance with 
Brown is continuing racial segregation in the school district. In 
Green, there is no discussion of “racial identifiability” or of the 
“racially monolithic” nature of the schools. Instead, Green 
considered the schools “segregated” on a continuing violation 
theory even in the absence of a racial classification scheme, just 
as the schools were “segregated” in Brown. 
Similarly in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of 
Education,58 the Court ruled that in a public school system with a 
history of de jure segregation there is a “presumption against 
schools that are substantially disproportionate in their racial 
composition.”59 Segregation was a form of proof that the 
underlying constitutional violation had not been remedied. 
Swann firmly placed the burden on school districts to 
demonstrate why substantial disproportionality in racial 
composition was not the result of prior de jure segregation.60 Of 
course, at the same time the Court articulated the de facto-de 
jure distinction; the obligations of the equal protection clause 
only extended to segregation that could be traced to state law or 
other purposeful, official action.61 De facto segregation, 
segregation that could be attributed to other more remote 
factors or private action, was not within the purview of the equal 
protection clause.62 
To be sure, the de facto-de jure distinction was (and is) a 
huge impediment to desegregation.63 As some members of the 
Court recognized, de facto segregation was often caused by state 
actors and the difficulty of ascertaining causation or assigning 
responsibility to a specific state actor should not constrain the 
reach of the equal protection clause.64 Justice Douglas’ blunt 
 
 58. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
 59. Id. at 26. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. at 17–18; see also Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 
189, 208 (1973) (“[T]he differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called 
de facto segregation to which we referred in Swann is purpose or intent to segregate.”). 
 62. Swann, 402 U.S. at 31–32 (1971). 
 63. BREST ET AL., supra note 3, at 936 (noting that “as the South began to integrate 
after 1968, Northern schools still remained largely segregated, leading to charges of 
unfairness by Southern politicians who felt that the federal courts were singling them out. 
Northern segregation was often the result of what was described as ‘de facto’ rather than 
‘de jure’ segregation”). 
 64. See, e.g., Keyes, 413 U.S. at 216 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“If a ‘neighborhood’ 
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assessment still holds true: “there is no constitutional difference 
between de jure and de facto segregation, for each is the product 
of state actions or policies.”65 The Court simply refused to 
acknowledge this fact. But one point bears mentioning that 
might suggest a more nuanced approach to the Court’s 
understanding of segregation. The de facto-de jure distinction 
was largely a regional dichotomy. As Justice Powell observed in 
his concurring opinion in Keyes, the Court had little interest in 
policing the de facto-de jure distinction in the South.66 By 1973, it 
was hard to argue that 100% of the racial identifiability in public 
schools in large, metropolitan areas of the South was attributable 
solely to discriminatory state laws that had been invalidated by 
Brown a generation before. Many of those schools were racially 
monolithic, but not necessarily for reasons that could be clearly 
traced to state laws requiring racial segregation. 
Moreover, some of the racial identifiability in those schools 
was clearly attributable to private action.67 The schools in the 
metropolitan South were racially monolithic for the same 
reasons that they were racially monolithic in the metropolitan 
North: “segregated residential and migratory patterns the impact 
of which on the racial composition of the schools was often 
perpetuated and rarely ameliorated by action of public school 
authorities.”68 Yet under the affirmative duty doctrine, Southern 
school authorities had a duty to ameliorate this kind of 
segregation, too. But absent a showing of discriminatory purpose 
underlying racially identifiable schools, Northern school 
authorities bore no such affirmative duty to desegregate. In the 
South, segregation was both evidence of an ongoing violation of 
the equal protection clause and signaled an affirmative duty to 
cure even though some of that segregation was not caused by 
 
or ‘geographical’ unit has been created along racial lines by reason of the play of 
restrictive covenants that restrict certain areas to ‘the elite,’ leaving the ‘undesirables’ to 
move elsewhere, there is state action in the constitutional sense because the force of law 
is placed behind those covenants.”). 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at 222 (Powell, J., concurring) (“In imposing on metropolitan southern 
school districts an affirmative duty, entailing large scale transportation of pupils, to 
eliminate segregation in the schools, the Court required these districts to alleviate 
conditions which in large part did not result from historic, state-imposed de jure 
segregation.”). 
 67. Id. at 222–23 (Powell, J. concurring) (asserting that “the familiar root cause of 
segregated schools in all the biracial metropolitan areas of our country is essentially the 
same: one of segregated residential and migratory patterns the impact of which on the 
racial composition of the schools was often perpetuated and rarely ameliorated by action 
of public school authorities”) (emphasis supplied). 
 68. Id. at 222–23 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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discriminatory state laws and could be attributed to private 
action. 
The standard narrative about the de facto-de jure distinction 
as a regional dichotomy is that the Court was punishing the 
“guilty” South, while allowing an often virulently racist North to 
go free.69 To be sure, this amounted to a double standard and 
desegregation in the North was far harder to achieve because of 
it.70 But it is worth remembering that at least in the Southern 
context, the Court was willing to place significant obligations on 
school authorities for segregation that they may not have caused, 
even as racial classification schemes mandating segregation 
receded into history. Green converted Brown’s injunction 
against discrimination into an “affirmative duty to integrate,”71 in 
situations where all of the observable segregation could not be 
attributed to school authorities. In the South, the Court’s 
concern about the harms of segregation transcended at least for 
a time its commitment to a pure anti-classification view of the 
equal protection clause. 
A. SEGREGATION AS A FORM OF EXCLUSION 
Brown’s journey North was indeed troubled. First in Keyes72 
and then in a series of later cases, the Court significantly 
constrained Brown remedies in the North73 and ultimately 
curtailed federal district courts’ ongoing jurisdiction over 
desegregation cases.74 In these cases, the Court balked at the 
invitation to extend the Brown mandate nationally and lost 
patience with aggressive federal court enforcement of 
desegregation decrees, particularly if those courts sought to 
retain jurisdiction in perpetuity. These two drivers, combined 
with the Court’s renewed emphasis on federalism and its own 
institutional legitimacy, drove the Court’s increasing sense of 
desegregation exhaustion. And yet even in this line of cases, the 
 
 69. BREST ET AL., supra note 3, at 936. 
 70. See id. 
 71. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 258 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing Green as a “drastic 
expansion” of Brown). 
 72. Id. at 208–09 (reifying the de facto-de jure distinction and absolving school 
authorities from any obligation to come into compliance with Brown in the North and 
West absent a finding of discriminatory purpose). 
 73. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken II); Pasadena City Bd. of 
Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken 
I). 
 74. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 
(1992); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991). 
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Court’s view of segregation was more nuanced than commonly 
appreciated. 
Take the Milliken v. Bradley cases,75 which are generally 
considered to be the low watermark in terms of the Court’s 
commitment to integration.76 In Milliken I, there was no dispute 
that the state of Michigan had engaged in de jure segregation in 
the City of Detroit.77 The question in Milliken I was what was the 
appropriate remedy for that constitutional violation.78 Because 
the City of Detroit was overwhelmingly black, the lower federal 
courts instituted an interdistrict desegregation plan, which used 
the predominantly white suburban schools as a desegregation 
resource in order to cure the constitutional violation.79 In 
Milliken I, the Court ruled interdistrict busing was impermissible 
to achieve integration unless the defendant committed an 
interdistrict violation: “where the racially discriminatory acts of 
one or more school districts caused racial segregation in an 
adjacent district, or where district lines have been deliberately 
drawn on the basis of race.”80 The outcome in Milliken I was 
simple yet devastating: no interdistrict violation, no interdistrict 
remedy. Because of the largely racially segregated nature of 
large metropolitan areas in the North and West and the difficulty 
of proving an interdistrict violation, this typically meant that no 
meaningful desegregation plan could be ordered by a federal 
court.81 
The Michigan case returned to the Court a second time to 
answer the following question: what was the permissible scope of 
an intradistrict remedy.82 On the state of Michigan’s view, it 
could not be required to remediate segregation’s deleterious 
effects on the Detroit public school system except to the extent 
 
 75. See supra note 73, and accompanying text. 
 76. See, e.g., Gary Orfield, Turning Back to Segregation in DISMANTLING 
DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (GARY 
ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON EDS., 1996) 1, 10, 12 (arguing that desegregation in 
American schools “hit a stone wall with the 1974 Milliken v. Bradley [I] decision” and 
describing Milliken II as providing a “limited form of reparations” that has “not been 
implemented successfully”).   
 77. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 723.  
 78. Id. at 721. 
 79. Id. at 739. 
 80. Id. at 745. 
 81. See Susan E. Eaton, Joseph Feldman & Edward Kirby, Still Separate, Still 
Unequal: The Limits of Milliken II’s Monetary Compensation to Segregated Schools in 
ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 76, at 143, 143–44 (arguing that in “coming years, Milliken I 
would make it all but impossible to achieve racial integration within predominantly 
minority school districts”). 
 82. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 269. 
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that they involved pupil placement.83 Thus, the state took the 
narrowest possible view of its remedial responsibility: a finding 
of an intradistrict violation against the state qualified the 
plaintiffs only for a Detroit-only pupil reassignment plan.84 
This argument, that the state’s responsibility was limited to 
student assignment, makes sense if one views Brown as solely 
concerned with racial classifications and as agnostic with respect 
to the harms associated with segregation. If the constitutional 
violation is segregating Detroit public school students “on the 
basis of race as a result of the official policies and actions of”85 
the State of Michigan, then an appropriate remedy would be a 
student assignment plan that provides for the maximum feasible 
amount of school desegregation within the city of Detroit. 
But the Court rejected this view. It held instead that 
Michigan could be forced to pay for remedial and compensatory 
programs, magnet schools, additional training for teachers, 
administrators, guidance counselors, and for counseling 
programs and augmented testing procedures.86 All of these 
elements of the remedial plan were intended to ameliorate the 
effects of the underlying constitutional violation.87 Milliken II 
stands for the proposition that “federal courts can order 
remedial education programs as part of a school desegregation 
decree.”88 
Milliken II represents a huge retreat from aggressive 
desegregation enforcement and is rightly viewed as a significant 
defeat for racial integration.89 But what is perhaps less commonly 
appreciated is that the Court in Milliken II was still deeply 
concerned about the harmful effects of segregation. Indeed, in a 
striking passage, the Court expressly detailed how exclusion 
from the larger more dominant group can create extreme harm, 
 
 83. Id. at 281. 
 84. Id. at 271. Indeed, the State of Michigan took the position that the 11th 
Amendment barred the federal courts from ordering the state to pay the costs of any 
compensatory remedial educational programs intended to overcome the effects of de 
jure segregation. Id. at 288–89. 
 85. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 723. 
 86. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 286–87. 
 87. Id. at 287. 
 88. Id. at 279. 
 89. See Eaton et al., supra note 81, at 145 (arguing that Milliken II remedies “have 
evolved not as permanent changes in opportunity structure, but as temporary, 
supplemental add-ons that are not linked to any systemic effort to redress harms of 
segregation”). 
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and offered a structural analysis of the role that segregation 
plays in creating inequality: 
On this record, however, we are bound to conclude that the 
decree before us was aptly tailored to remedy the con-
sequences of the constitutional violation. Children who have 
been thus educationally and culturally set apart from the 
larger community will inevitably acquire habits of speech, 
conduct, and attitudes reflecting their cultural isolation. They 
are likely to acquire speech habits, for example, which vary 
from the environment in which they must ultimately function 
and compete, if they are to enter and be a part of that 
community. This is not peculiar to race; in this setting, it can 
affect any children who, as a group, are isolated by force of 
law from the mainstream.90 
The Court’s view of segregation in Milliken II is surprisingly 
nuanced and complex. The Court understands segregation and 
exclusion to be one in the same, and suggests that exclusion from 
the mainstream is an independent and perhaps special kind of 
harm. For the Court, segregation simultaneously stigmatizes and 
deprives because it sets children “educationally and culturally” 
apart from the larger group and inculcates different “habits of 
speech, conduct, and attitudes” that reflect cultural isolation. 
Segregation also handicaps children in their ability to compete 
with other Americans for jobs and other social benefits. The 
Court recognizes that this exclusion has a functional, structural 
component: when individuals are separated out from the larger 
group harm occurs. This exclusionary harm is that much more 
amplified when it has the force of race. Indeed, in Milliken II, 
the Court comes close to explicitly acknowledging the role that 
segregation plays in creating social stratification and 
perpetuating a caste system. For the Court, this harm had to be 
remediated through a compensatory regime; a Detroit-only 
student assignment plan would not do.91 This remedy vastly 
undercompensated the harm, but the Court recognized that 
harm nonetheless. 
There is no question that plaintiffs in Milliken I had the 
better of the argument about the appropriate of remedy for de 
jure segregation: only an interdistrict remedy could guarantee 
meaningful desegregation given the racial composition of the 
 
 90. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 287. 
 91. Eaton et al., supra note 81, at 144 (“Perhaps the most far-reaching aspect of 
Milliken II was its declaration that states found guilty of prior discrimination must pay 
for remedial educational programs.”). 
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City of Detroit and surrounding areas. The Court rejected this 
view and blessed a Detroit-only remedy. In a sense, the Milliken 
cases expose the duality of the Court’s understanding of 
segregation. In the Milliken cases, the Court correctly and 
powerfully diagnosed the harm: segregation is a powerful mode 
of exclusion. But at the same time, it refused to countenance a 
meaningful desegregative remedy that would have functioned as 
a powerful engine of inclusion. In other contexts, however, the 
Court has upheld integrative remedies that transverse local 
jurisdictional limits.92 
B. SEGREGATION AS A SOCIAL PROBLEM 
In some respects, the Milliken cases are emblematic of how 
the Court has often viewed segregation. A majority of the Court 
views segregation as a significant social problem and as distinct 
from the harms associated with racial classifications, but its 
concern about segregation manifests in divergent and sometimes 
schizophrenic ways. On the one hand, the Court’s later Brown 
implementation cases display a deep desire to draw bright-line 
distinctions between constitutionally actionable de jure 
segregation and constitutionally irrelevant racial imbalances. So 
for instance, in Freeman v. Pitts,93 the Court limited the ability of 
federal courts to address racial imbalances not causally linked to 
state action: 
Where resegregation is a product not of state action but of 
private choices, it does not have constitutional implications. It 
is beyond the authority and beyond the practical ability of the 
federal courts to try to counteract these kinds of continuous 
and massive demographic shifts. To attempt such results 
would require ongoing and never-ending supervision by the 
courts of school districts simply because they were once de 
jure segregated.94 
In Freeman, the Court articulated a bright-line rule: demo-
graphic and residential changes leading to racial imbalances 
were outside of federal court authority, but racial imbalances 
that could be linked to prior de jure discrimination, that is 
 
 92. See, e.g., Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 298 (1976) (ruling that Milliken I did 
not establish “a per se rule that federal courts lack authority to order parties found to 
have violated the Constitution to undertake remedial efforts beyond the municipal 
boundaries” and upholding a remedial plan that required the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development to take action beyond the boundaries of the City of Chicago). 
 93. 503 U.S. 467 (1992). 
 94. Id. at 495. 
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“segregation” were within federal court authority.95 And just a 
few years later, in Missouri v. Jenkins,96 the Court ruled that a 
district court exceeded its remedial authority when it authorized 
a desegregation order including major capital improvements, 
quality education programs and teacher salary increases for the 
purposes of attracting non-minority suburban students to an 
urban school district in order to ameliorate an intradistrict rather 
than an interdistrict constitutional violation.97  In so doing, the 
Court sounded a similar theme: just “as demographic changes 
independent of de jure segregation will affect the racial 
composition of student assignments, so too will numerous 
external factors beyond the control of the [defendants] affect 
minority student achievement. So long as these external factors 
are not the result of segregation, they do not figure in the 
remedial calculus.”98 Thus, in both cases, the Court drew a broad 
distinction between racial imbalances (non-constitutionally 
actionable predominantly single-race spaces) and segregation 
(constitutionally relevant predominantly single-race spaces). 
And yet even where the Court issued rulings such as 
Freeman and Jenkins which clearly retarded the desegregation 
process, it refrained from adopting the view championed by 
Justice Thomas that racial imbalances are socially net neutral or 
even socially valuable. Consider Justice Thomas’ concurrence in 
Jenkins. Justice Thomas’ quarrel was with the district court’s 
initial liability determination. On Justice Thomas’ view, in order 
for the district court to conclude that the constitution was 
violated in the absence of a fresh showing of de jure segregation, 
it must have equated the racially isolated nature of the KSMSD 
with some sort of harm.  But if there was no state action which 
created the racially identifiable school district, then the district 
court must have assumed that there was something problematic 
about the predominantly black composition of the schools 
themselves. How else could one explain the district court’s initial 
finding of liability when the possibility of de jure segregation was 
so remote. Justice Thomas argued, “in effect, the court found 
that racial imbalances constituted an ongoing constitutional 
violation that continued to inflict harm on black students. This 
 
 95. Id. at 496 (“The vestiges of segregation that are the concern of the law in a 
school case may be subtle and intangible but nonetheless they must be so real that they 
have a causal link to the de jure violation being remedied.”). 
 96. 515 U.S. 70 (1995). 
 97. Id. at 100. 
 98. Id. at 102 (citations omitted). 
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position appears to rest upon the idea that any school that is 
black is inferior, and that blacks cannot succeed without the 
benefit of the company of whites.”99 Thus, Justice Thomas 
asserted that the only way the district court could have 
concluded that the defendants violated the constitution was 
because it equated majority-black schools with inferiority. 
Justice Thomas reasoned that racial imbalances cannot 
justify far-ranging desegregation orders, an assumption that is 
largely echoed in the majority opinion. But Justice Thomas’ 
concurrence goes further and captures the essence of the on-
going conversation about segregation on the Court. Justice 
Thomas’ point is that courts must draw no negative inference at 
all about significant racial imbalances. On Justice Thomas’ view, 
in the absence of de jure segregation to make a negative 
assumption about racial imbalances employs a “Jim Crow” mode 
of thinking. Justice Thomas opined: it “never ceases to amaze 
me that the courts are so willing to assume that anything that is 
predominantly black must be inferior.”100 Thus, Justice Thomas’ 
implication is clear: if de facto segregation is largely the product 
of private choice or other voluntary action there is no reason to 
believe that racial imbalance is problematic unless, of course, 
one is a racist. Justice Thomas would have the Court hold that 
racial imbalances are not just constitutionally irrelevant, but are 
constitutionally invisible. 
But a majority of the Court has not taken this view. 
Notwithstanding the Court’s attempt to draw bright-line rules it 
is still engaged in a debate about the constitutional implications 
of de facto racial segregation. Perhaps this is because segregation 
can create harm even without the sanction of state law. That is, 
segregation reifies and strengthens the underlying processes of 
social categorization, unequal allocation of resources and racial 
stigma. Segregation is an extraordinarily effective mechanism for 
perpetuating racial and social hierarchy. 
Douglas Massey has recently argued that the process of 
stratification explains much of the social inequality we currently 
observe in American society.101 Massey defines stratification as 
the “unequal distribution of people across social categories that 
are characterized by differential access to scarce [material, 
 
 99. Id. at 118–19 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 100. Id. at 114. 
 101. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, CATEGORICALLY UNEQUAL: THE AMERICAN 
STRATIFICATION SYSTEM (2007). 
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symbolic, and emotional] resources.”102 Various stratification 
systems or processes exist which order people hierarchically in 
our society, with those at the top of the social order having more 
access to these scarce resources.103 For Massey, while 
stratification processes vary they “boil down to a combination of 
two simple but powerful mechanisms: the allocation of people to 
social categories, and the institutionalization of practices that 
allocate resources unequally across those categories.”104 
The first component necessary for stratification is social 
categorization. In our society, one very powerful way that people 
are socially categorized is by race. Historically dark skin—a 
highly visible yet morally irrelevant characteristic—is associated 
with systematic social disadvantages that are very real.105 Black 
Americans are systematically below white Americans across a 
variety of important social welfare and economic indicia.106 Thus, 
dark skin signals social disadvantage. But at the same time, dark 
skin also creates caste-based harm, such as racial stigma and 
injury to self-respect. This is the case because when “someone is 
a member of a group that is systematically subordinate to others, 
and when the group characteristic is highly visible, insults to self-
respect are likely to occur nearly every day.”107 Indeed, 
individuals possessing the particular characteristic—dark skin—
become defined not as individuals who “happen to be black,” 
but as members of a subordinated group where that 
characteristic predominates, “black people.” The stigma 
associated with such group membership is “what it means to be a 
member of a lower caste.”108 
As Robin Lenhardt has explained, racial stigma refers to the 
negative meanings that we as a society associate with dark skin.109 
Lenhardt argues that people with dark skin are viewed as less 
than fully human and that they are cloaked with a negative 
“virtual social identity” they do not choose.110 The virtual social 
identity widely ascribed to black people—of criminality, 
impetuousness, promiscuity, stupidity, sloth—obscures and 
 
 102. Id. at 1. 
 103. Id. at 2. 
 104. Id. at 5–6. 
 105. Cass R. Sunstein, The AntiCaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2430 (1994). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. at 2432. 
 109. R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 809 (2004). 
 110. Id. at 816–21. 
!!!ADAMS-281-RACIAL INCLUSION2.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 5/31/2012  12:04 PM 
22 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 28:1 
 
sublimates black individuals’ actual identity, undermining 
individuality. For Lenhardt, “[r]ace becomes a sort of a mask, a 
barrier that both makes it impossible for the stigmatized 
person’s true self to be seen and fixes the range of responses that 
others will have to that person.”111 Thus, negative social meaning 
attaches to those with dark skin in an automatic and unconscious 
fashion.112 Widely shared dehumanizing meanings associated 
with race operate at a pre-conscious level in ways which trigger 
racially discriminatory conduct and racial microaggressions; 
exacerbate racial disparities; erode self-esteem; undercut the 
ability of black persons to participate fully in community and 
governmental processes, and “distort perception and spoil social 
interactions between racially stigmatized and nonstigmatized 
individuals.”113 Race is an essential component in social 
stratification because it provides the mechanism for categorizing 
people into in and out groups, of distinguishing between the 
dominant and the subordinate in our social structure. 
The second component necessary for stratification is the 
unequal allocation of resources between social groups. Unequal 
allocation of resources occurs through the processes of 
competition, exploitation and opportunity hoarding. In any 
social structure, groups will compete for dominance with respect 
not only to political power and material resources, but also for 
social status, that is “social approval, respect, and admiration for 
one’s self and one’s style of life . . . .”114 This is the case because 
status correlates with and often produces wealth, political power 
and other social goods,115 and because of the limited pool of 
status benefits.116 Because status is a relative good, in order for 
one group to have more another must have less.117 When social 
groups interact—economically, politically, socially—they play an 
endless number of interactive “games” with the winning group 
achieving status benefits at the losing group’s expense. The 
natural outcome to such competition will be status hierarchies, 
the most extreme of which is a system of race-based caste.118 
Exploitation “occurs when people in one social group 
 
 111. Id. at 819. 
 112. Id. at 825. 
 113. Id. at 836–47. 
 114. J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2327 (1997). 
 115. Id. at 2328 (“Status capital can be converted, though often imperfectly and 
unpredictably, into other forms of capital and economic and social power.”). 
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. at 2328–29. 
 118. Id. at 2323, 2358. 
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expropriate a resource produced by members of another social 
group and prevent them from realizing the full value of their 
effort in producing it.”119 
Finally, opportunity hoarding is classic monopolistic 
behavior. Opportunity hoarding “occurs when one social group 
restricts access to a scarce resource, either through outright 
denial or by exercising monopoly control that requires out-group 
members to pay rent in return for access. Either way, 
opportunity hoarding is enabled through a socially defined 
process of exclusion.”120 Now we can appreciate the relationship 
among segregation, the mechanics of stratification and the social 
meaning of race. Race is socially constructed; it is both a signal 
of lower status and a cognitive heuristic triggering negative 
social meanings. At the same time, groups endlessly compete for 
social status, exploiting resources and exacting monopoly rents 
from out-groups. The result is stratification and inequality: 
segregation facilitates this entire process. 
From this perspective, Justice Thomas’ constitutional 
invisibility approach is unpersuasive precisely because it is 
woefully underinclusive. One way that segregation harms is 
when the state imposes racial separation. But that is not the only 
way that segregation creates harm. If segregation is the binding 
agent of inequality, then government should be applauded 
rather than condemned for attempting to address it. A 
constitutional vision which requires state actors to ignore the 
harm that de facto segregation can create demands a kind of 
constitutional blindness that a majority of the Court has not 
countenanced. As discussed in the next Part, the Court often 
responds to racial classification schemes that explicitly segregate 
as a particularly virulent and problematic form of racial 
classification. 
III. RACIAL CLASSIFICATION SCHEMES, 
SEGREGATION OR BOTH: TWO READINGS OF  
SHAW V. RENO 
The harms associated with segregation are not necessarily 
the same as the harms associated with racial classification 
schemes. Shaw v. Reno121 is illustrative of this view. In Shaw, the 
Court considered the constitutionality of a North Carolina 
 
 119. MASSEY, supra note 101, at 6 (italics in original). 
 120. Id. 
 121. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
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reapportionment plan that created two majority-black districts 
with irregular district boundary lines.122 The governmental action 
at issue, drawing boundary lines “of dramatically irregular 
shape”123 was facially race neutral. Typically, facially race-neutral 
government actions do not violate the equal protection clause.124 
However, the Court ruled that the redistricting plan was so 
bizarre and irregular that it was “unexplainable on grounds 
other than race,”125 and thus it “demands the same close scrutiny 
that we give other state laws that classify citizens by race.”126  
Ultimately, the Court held that the districting plan could only be 
viewed “as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting 
districts because of their race” and thus presumptively violated 
the equal protection clause.127 
Of course, one might understand Shaw as a racial 
classification case. On this view, the reason why the districting 
scheme violated the equal protection clause was because the 
government action classified individuals on the basis of their 
race by separating them into racially identifiable electoral 
districts. In Shaw, the bizarre nature of the district lines 
themselves expressed an impermissible and very public racial 
message.128 Thus, the Court inferred from the shape of the 
districts that the purpose of the redistricting plan was to 
“segregate voters on the basis of race . . . .”129 Once the Court 
made that inference the redistricting scheme was tantamount to 
a racial classification and strict scrutiny automatically applied.130 
On this view, when the Court says there is a right to participate 
in a “‘color-blind’ electoral process”131 it means the political 
process should not be tainted with racial classification schemes. 
But it would be a mistake to view Shaw as solely concerned 
with rooting out racial classifications schemes that infect the 
political process. In Shaw, the Court also speaks to the harms 
associated with segregation in the political process. The 
 
 122. Id. at 633–34. 
 123. Id. at 633. 
 124. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–
65 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240–41 (1976). 
 125. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 644. 
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. at 658. 
 128. Id. at 630, 647 (“[W]e believe that reapportionment is one area in which 
appearances do matter.”) (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266). 
 129. Id. at 669. 
 130. Id. at 658. 
 131. Id. at 641–42. 
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government’s action was facially race neutral. Thus, the question 
was whether that action was animated by a discriminatory 
purpose.132 Shaw holds that intent to segregate is a discriminatory 
purpose, whether the government’s motive is to perpetuate 
white supremacy or to eradicate past discriminatory harm. Shaw 
ruled that even government action designed to benefit members 
of historically disadvantaged groups could not be justified 
because of the harms associated with segregation. But as I 
discuss below, the Court has taken exactly the opposite position 
with respect to government action intended to integrate: 
sometimes the government may take otherwise constitutionally 
impermissible (or at least constitutionally questionable) action 
into account in an effort to promote racial integration. 
Indeed, Shaw condemns racial segregation in the strongest 
possible terms. The Court’s discussion of the harms of the 
reapportionment plan focused on the problems of separation 
and exclusion in the political process. For instance, the Court in 
Shaw opined that majority-minority districts, created from 
geographically and politically disparate communities run the risk 
of creating “political apartheid.”133 The Court stated that such 
electoral districts reinforce “the perception that members of the 
same racial group—regardless of their age, education, economic 
status, or the community in which they live—think alike, share 
the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates 
at the polls.”134 Thus, the Court condemned such districts as 
creating “impermissible racial stereotypes.”135 
But the Court did not stop there. In addition, such districts 
also artificially balkanize citizens into conflicting polities, 
exacerbate racial block voting and erode the democratic 
representative process by signaling to elected representative that 
“their primary obligation is to represent only the members of 
that group, rather than their constituency as a whole.”136 Shaw’s 
central claim is that segregation, not just racial classification 
schemes, harms the polity. Shaw argues that segregation creates 
profound systemic problems that are cognitive, process-based 
and deliberative in nature. These harms transcend any particular 
white plaintiff’s entitlement to a specific benefit or vested right, 
the kinds of harms the Court is most concerned with in the 
 
 132. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).  
 133. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647. 
 134. Id. at 647. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 648. 
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traditional affirmative action context. Shaw takes place outside 
of any merits-based determination; it speaks of the democracy-
based harms created by segregation. Moreover, Shaw suggests 
that the gravity of those harms are so great that the normal 
elements of Art. III standing, including the “injury in fact” 
requirement is relaxed. Along these lines, consider Justice 
White’s view in dissent that the claim recognized in Shaw (the 
right to participate in a “colorblind” electoral process) did not 
require that any particular voter demonstrate a constitutionally 
cognizable injury.137 
Even if one takes the position that Shaw and Miller were 
wrongly decided either because the cases unnecessarily 
hamstring government’s ability to protect minority rights in a 
winner take all political process and vindicate the aims of the 
Voting Rights Act and/or because they relax normal standing 
requirements, one must still acknowledge the harms associated 
with segregation in the electoral districting context. As Elizabeth 
Anderson has argued, racial segregation creates democracy-
based harms.138 The touchstone of democratic self-government is 
reciprocal claim-making based on discussion and deliberation 
among equal citizens.139 But spatial segregation, “exacerbated by 
racial and partisan gerrymandering of legislative districts,”140 
undermines collective self-governance by manufacturing real 
differences between people rather than a sense of unity. Under 
conditions of segregation, people of different races really are 
from different walks of life, with different and often adverse 
political interests.141 
 
 137. Id. at 659 (White, J., dissenting). Moreover, a dramatically irregular shape is not 
a necessary prerequisite for finding a Shaw violation. In Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 
(1995), the Court ruled that the government’s intent to segregate voters rather than 
district shape was the essence of the harm recognized in Shaw. To be sure, like Shaw, 
Miller is open to competing interpretations. It speaks to the impermissibility of race-
based government action, but it also speaks to the separation that flows from such action. 
Id. at 911 (“[T]he essence of the equal protection claim recognized in Shaw is that the 
State has used race as a basis for separating voters into districts.”).  
 138. Elizabeth Anderson, The Future of Racial Integration 229, 235–36 in 
CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY (LAURENCE THOMAS ed., 2008). 
 139. Id. at 235. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. As Anderson puts it, since  
the residents of the overwhelmingly white districts don’t benefit from public 
spending in the other districts, the ordinary competition among districts for 
public goods acquires a racial cast. The same lack of benefits means that 
segregated blacks are less able to find coalition partners of other races. . . . A 
politician in an overwhelmingly white district is free to advance policies that 
have a grossly differential negative impact on disadvantaged racial groups, 
without being held to account for the costs imposed on other racial groups, and 
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The state’s motive in drawing the district boundary lines in 
Shaw was not integrative. Instead, the state drew the lines to 
come into compliance with the Voting Rights Act, and more 
specifically to facilitate the “election of a member of a group 
that lacks” electoral power.142 To be sure, Justice White is correct 
that a “state’s compliance with the Voting Rights Act clearly 
constitutes a compelling interest.”143 The fact that the Court did 
not affirm that understanding is deeply problematic. But Shaw 
can also be read to stand for the proposition that segregation 
itself poses special societal harms. 
IV. SOLVING THE EXCLUSION/INCLUSION RIDDLE: 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL VISIBILITY OF DE FACTO 
SEGREGATION 
The Court is deeply divided about what segregation 
“means” and/or whether de facto segregation has any 
constitutional relevance at all. Perhaps because of this 
uncertainty, the question of the constitutionality of the use of 
racial preferences continues to percolate through the lower 
federal courts. In Fisher v. University of Texas,144 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the 
University of Texas’ affirmative action plan did not violate the 
equal protection clause.145 The affirmative action plan at issue in 
Fisher was patterned largely on the affirmative action plan the 
Court upheld in Grutter v. Bollinger.146 The Fifth Circuit 
explicitly relied on Grutter in reaching its conclusion to uphold 
the University of Texas affirmative action plan against con-
stitutional challenge.147 But in a special concurrence, Judge 
Emilio Garza urged the Supreme Court to overturn Grutter. The 
 
possibly without even knowing the costs. 
Id. at 235–36. But see Heather Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 
1102–05 (2005) (arguing that “democracy sometimes benefits from having 
decisionmaking bodies that do not mirror the underlying population.” In the context of 
electoral districting, Gerken highlights three benefits to electoral minorities of majority-
minority districting: the ability to exert power normally reserved for the dominant group, 
creation of a political space where the members of the majority experience the loss of 
“comfort  . . associated with their majority status,” and increased visibility “showcas[ing] 
division and dissent within [the minority] groups”). 
 142. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 678 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 143. Id. at 674 (White, J., dissenting). 
 144. 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 1652 (U.S. Feb. 21, 
2012) (No. 11-345). 
 145. Id. at 217 
 146. 539 U.S. 306 (2003); 631 F.3d at 217–18. 
 147. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 218. 
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special concurrence displays a judge struggling to apply binding 
precedent that he believes is profoundly inconsistent with 
“fundamental principles of constitutional law,”148 while 
simultaneously urging the high court to correct its profound 
error.149 The Court’s recent decision to review the Fisher case 
suggests that it is poised to address Judge Garza’s concerns.150 
In Grutter v. Bollinger,151 the Court took a permissive view 
of the government’s ability to take account of racial imbalances 
and a hostile view of segregation. At issue in Grutter was the 
constitutionality of the University of Michigan Law School’s 
affirmative action plan, which used race as a factor in making 
admissions determinations.152 One of the purposes of the Law 
School’s admissions plan was to achieve a “critical mass” of 
minority law students so that “racial stereotypes lose their force 
because nonminority students learn there is no ‘minority 
viewpoint’ but rather a variety of viewpoints among minority 
students.”153 Under the Law School’s affirmative action plan, 
“critical mass” was never precisely defined. And evidence 
adduced at trial indicated that there was a tight correlation 
“between the percentage of the Law School’s pool of applicants 
who are members of the three minority groups and the 
percentage of the admitted applicants who are members of these 
same groups,”154 suggesting a “carefully managed program 
 
 148. Id. at 247 (Garza, J., concurring). 
 149. Judge Garza’s concurrence reads much more like a dissent than a concurrence. 
First, Judge Garza argued that Grutter is out of step with previously prevailing equal 
protection doctrine, because it allowed for deferential rather than skeptical application of 
strict scrutiny review. Id. at 249 (arguing that Grutter incorrectly redefined strict scrutiny 
review). Thus, he asserted that Grutter is erroneous and fosters “a regime that 
encourages opacity and is incapable of meaningful judicial review under any level of 
scrutiny.” Id. But Judge Garza did not just focus on the Court’s relaxed application of 
strict scrutiny review; he also attacked the Court’s holding that racial diversity is a 
compelling interest in the higher education setting. Id. at 254–59. On Judge Garza’s view, 
the Court was profoundly mistaken in finding that racial diversity amounts to a 
compelling interest in the higher education context at least in part because some of the 
benefits of such diversity were not education-specific. Id. at 257–58. 
 150. See Fisher, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 1652 
(U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 11-345), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/11-
00345qp.pdf (certifying the Question Presented as “[w]hether this Court’s decisions 
interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, including 
Grutter v. Bollinger, permit the University of Texas at Austin’s use of race in 
undergraduate admissions decisions”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 151. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 152. Id. at 311. 
 153. Id. at 318, 320. 
 154. Id. at 383 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
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designed to ensure proportionate representation of applicants 
from selected minority groups.”155 
Thus, there were two possible ways to view the Law 
School’s attempt to achieve critical mass: as an impermissible 
attempt to achieve some preconceived notion of racial balance in 
the Law School for its own sake, which is “patently uncon-
stitutional”156 or as the Court held, as an effort to achieve the 
educational benefits of racial diversity in higher education.157 For 
the Court, the reason why the Law School was not engaging in 
racial balancing was because its use of race was intended to 
achieve a variety of benefits, some that were specific to the 
educational process and others that were external to that process 
and which contribute to the greater good of society more 
generally. 
For instance, the Court described three interrelated types of 
benefits provided by racial diversity. First, the Court explained 
that racial diversity is a means of enhancing cross-racial 
understanding and better educational outcomes within the Law 
School.158 Next, the Court opined that racial diversity at the Law 
School is a critical means of enhancing students’ ability to work 
and thrive as citizens in a multi-racial environment after 
graduation.159 Finally, the Court took the position that the Law 
School is a leadership incubator; only a racially diverse law 
school class can produce the multi-racial leadership necessary to 
maintain a legitimate democracy in the 21st century.160 Only 
opening up the Law School to students of different races and 
backgrounds could provide these benefits. But however those 
benefits were defined, the Court’s meta-focus was on 
accessibility and inclusion: that the “diffusion of knowledge and 
opportunity through public institutions of higher education must 
be accessible to all individuals regardless of race or ethnicity.”161 
 
 155. Id. at 386. 
 156. Id. at 330. 
 157. Id.  
 158. Id.  
 159. Id. at 330–32. 
 160. Id. at 332–33. 
 161. Id. at 331; see also Michelle Adams, Stifling the Potential of Grutter v. Bollinger: 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 88 B.U. L. REV. 
937, 951–52 (2008) (asserting that Grutter emphasizes the importance of inclusion of 
minorities in higher education both because historically excluded minorities should have 
access to the benefits of higher education as a form of remediation for past dis-
crimination, and because their inclusion serves “to undercut the ugly message com-
municated about society generally by their exclusion from prominent public institutions: 
that of a society still hopelessly rent by racial division, segregation and animosity”). 
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If racial balance is sought for its own sake, it is 
unconstitutional. But if the government’s goal is broadly 
inclusionary, as the Law School’s was in Grutter, then the Court 
is willing to dismiss the suggestion of impermissible racial 
balancing. The trouble is that it is hard to tell the difference 
between the two, and in Grutter the Court deferred to the Law 
School that its underlying goal was racial diversity rather than 
racial balancing.162 The Court allowed the government to use an 
otherwise impermissible racial classification scheme to achieve 
the result of racial inclusion. And, the Court deferred to the Law 
School as to the importance and centrality of racial diversity to 
its underlying educational goals. As I have written elsewhere, 
the best explanation for the Court’s holding in Grutter is as an 
embrace of integration.163 Stated differently, Grutter is about 
undermining the exclusionary aspects of racial segregation. It 
suggests that government may use racial classifications to open-
up previously closed racial hierarchies. 
More recent precedent may undermine Grutter’s 
enthusiastic embrace of racial integration and inclusion. 
Consider Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School District.164 At issue in Parents Involved, were two student 
assignment plans that used race in an effort to racially diversify 
the Seattle and Louisville public school districts.165 Writing for 
the Court, Chief Justice Roberts ruled that the two student 
assignment plans were not narrowly tailored to achieve a 
compelling governmental purpose and thus were unconstitu-
tional.166 In an opinion for a plurality of the Court, Chief Justice 
Roberts went even further and attacked the anti-segregative 
rationale for the school districts’ plans as efforts to achieve racial 
balancing.167 For Chief Justice Roberts, racial diversity, 
avoidance of racial isolation and racial integration all amounted 
to the very same thing: impermissible racial balancing.168 Chief 
Justice Roberts’ argument attempted to equate all efforts to 
achieve racial integration and to overcome the effects of racial 
isolation (otherwise known as segregation) with racial balancing. 
 
 162. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. 
 163. Michelle Adams, Radical Integration, 94 CALF. L. REV. 261, 286 (2006). 
 164. 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 165. Id. at 711. 
 166. Id. at 747–48. 
 167. Id. at 726. 
 168. Id.  
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It is important to understand Chief Justice Roberts’ 
rhetorical maneuver. There is constitutional clarity about racial 
balancing: it is impermissible. But, as discussed above, the Court 
has taken differing and sometimes inconsistent views on racial 
segregation. Thus, there is constitutional uncertainty about what 
government can do to ameliorate racial segregation. Sometimes 
government can use race to achieve racial diversity and enhance 
racial integration. Sometimes the Court views racial classifica-
tion schemes that are obviously segregative as particularly 
virulent. At other times, the Court has acknowledged the 
profound harms of segregation even as it has refused to 
countenance integration-oriented remedies. There is an ongoing 
debate within the Court about the meaning of racial segregation 
and about what steps the government may take to eradicate it. 
Indeed, this was the very essence of Justice Breyer’s Parents 
Involved dissent, which emphasized the almost existential 
difficulty posed by attempting to disentangle de jure from de 
facto segregation. In particular, Justice Breyer attacked the 
plurality’s position that because there had never been a judicial 
finding of de jure segregation in Seattle, that any racial 
imbalance in the Seattle public schools could not provide the 
necessary predicate for a race-conscious student assignment 
plan.169 On this view, racial concentrations untied to a court 
ordered desegregation decree simply could not justify a race-
based student assignment plan intended to remedy past 
intentional discrimination.170 
Justice Breyer began from an entirely different premise: the 
schools were segregated in fact and the Seattle school district 
had been the defendant in a lawsuit alleging unconstitutional 
segregation.171 Thus, for Justice Breyer, the presence of a court 
ordered finding of de jure segregation was not necessary to 
support the student assignment plan.172 Justice Breyer argued 
that a court order should not take on talismanic significance 
because government can facilitate, encourage, authorize or 
otherwise take responsibility for segregation even where the 
judiciary fails to affirm that fact. On this view, a court order does 
the “work” of creating an artificial line demarcating de facto 
 
 169. Id. at 830 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 170. Id. at 720–21. 
 171. Id. at 808. That litigation ultimately settled. Id. at 810. 
 172. Id. at 844. 
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from de jure segregation, but the distinction between the two is 
far more elusive. 
No one here disputes that Louisville’s segregation was de jure. 
But what about Seattle’s? Was it de facto? De jure? A 
mixture? Opinions differed. Or is it that a prior federal court 
had not adjudicated the matter? Does that make a difference? 
Is Seattle free on remand to say that its schools were de jure 
segregated, just as in 1956 a memo for the school board 
admitted? The plurality does not seem confident as to the 
answer. 
A court finding of de jure segregation cannot be the crucial 
variable. After all, a number of school districts in the South 
that the Government or private plaintiffs challenged as 
segregated by law voluntarily desegregated their schools 
without a court order—just as Seattle did.173 
This argument is animated by the assertion that there is a 
constitutional difference between governmental actions designed 
to include versus those designed to exclude.174 Thus, strict 
scrutiny review should not be fatal when a governmental entity 
like the Seattle school district takes race-conscious steps to 
“bring the races together,” rather than to “keep the races 
apart.”175 Justice Breyer’s dissent supports the view that the 
Court’s understanding of racial segregation is more nuanced and 
unsettled than the Parents Involved plurality suggests. 
Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts’ plurality opinion attempts to 
fill that constitutional void by reducing racial integration and/or 
attempts to address racial segregation to the status of 
impermissible racial balancing. From this perspective, “racial 
balancing” is an ad hominem attack; a rhetorical trope that can 
be used to eviscerate the most recent precedent affirming racial 
integration: Grutter. Surely, the Law School’s action in Grutter 
could have been ascribed to a desire to achieve racial balance for 
its own sake.176 But the Grutter Court rejected that conclusion. If 
Chief Justice Roberts’ view equating racial integration with 
 
 173. Id. at 821–22 (citations omitted). 
 174. Id. at 830 (“I have found no case that otherwise repudiated this constitutional 
asymmetry between that which seeks to exclude and that which seeks to include 
members of minority races.”). 
 175. Id. at 829. 
 176. Indeed, that was the core of Justice Thomas’ argument in dissent. See Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 355 (2003) (“How, then, is the Law School’s interest in these 
allegedly unique educational ‘benefits’ not simply the forbidden interest in ‘racial 
balancing,’ that the majority expressly rejects?”) (citation omitted). 
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racial balancing were to command a majority of the Court, 
Grutter v. Bollinger would almost certainly cease to be good law. 
But Parents Involved can also be read to affirm Grutter. 
Justice Kennedy did not join Chief Justice Roberts for crucial 
parts of his analysis, robbing the Court of a majority for the most 
far-reaching of his assertions. Instead, in a concurring opinion, 
Justice Kennedy explained that government may take race into 
account in order to ensure that “all people have equal 
opportunity regardless of their race.”177 Justice Kennedy opined 
that the Constitution does not require public school districts to 
“ignore the problem of de facto resegregation in schooling.”178 
He then outlined a wide variety of facially race-neutral actions 
that school districts could take with the overt race-conscious goal 
of ameliorating racial segregation in the public schools.179 None 
of these actions would trigger strict scrutiny review.180 But why 
not? If the government were to take facially race-neutral actions 
with an intent to segregate, there is little question that strict 
scrutiny would not only apply but that such actions would be 
struck down as a violation of the Equal Protection clause.181 
The answer has to be that segregation of whatever stripe 
matters. In Parents Involved, neither school district was 
attempting to take account of the effects of de jure segregation. 
There was no de jure segregation to remedy. The central 
question in the case turned on the constitutional status of 
segregation: whether and to what extent public school districts 
could take account of race in order to enhance racial diversity 
and whether public school districts may use racial classifications 
to “reduce racial concentration in schools and to ensure that 
racially concentrated housing patterns do not prevent nonwhite 
students from having access to the most desirable schools.”182 
Even after Parents Involved, school districts may take 
overtly race-conscious steps—short of classifying individual 
students by race—to ameliorate the harms of segregation for 
which they are not legally responsible. Justice Kennedy 
characterized the compelling interest at stake in perhaps the 
 
 177. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788. 
 178. Id.  
 179. Id. at 789. 
 180. Id.  
 181. See, e.g., Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (holding that closing 
county public schools while at the same time providing tuition grants and tax credits for 
children to attend private segregated schools violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
 182. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 725. 
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most far-reaching way possible: a “compelling interest exists in 
avoiding racial isolation, an interest that a school district, in its 
discretion and expertise, may choose to pursue.”183 When Justice 
Kennedy speaks of “avoiding racial isolation” it is hard to 
believe that he is referring to Chief Justice Robert’s vision of 
“racial imbalances.” And, at another point in his concurrence, 
Justice Kennedy’s suggests that there is indeed a compelling 
interest in remedying the harms that flow from de facto 
segregation.184 Clearly, Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas 
and several members of the Court see this issue very differently. 
For those justices, there is no “segregation” of which to take 
account. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article began with two quotes. The first suggested that 
de facto segregation was constitutionally irrelevant.185 The 
second suggested that government has a constitutionally 
compelling interest in avoiding racial isolation, that is, in 
addressing racial segregation.186  While much of the Court’s 
doctrine can be read to comport with the first view, the Court 
has often spoken explicitly about the evils of de facto racial 
segregation as distinct from the harms associated with racial 
classification schemes. In some contexts, the Court has 
acknowledged that de facto segregation operates as a 
particularly effective mechanism of exclusion, separating 
individuals on the basis of race and preventing them from having 
access to opportunity. This Article has argued that the Court has 
evidenced far more concern about segregation as an 
exclusionary and stigmatizing mechanism than many scholars 
and commentators recognize. Thus, a very specific type of anti-
subordination value often animates the Court’s equal protection 
jurisprudence: a concern about the corrosive effects of racial 
segregation. 
Of course, current Courts are not always sensitive to the 
concerns of past Courts, particularly if those concerns failed to 
 
 183. Id. at 797 (emphasis supplied). 
 184. Id. at 788 (“The plurality opinion is at least open to the interpretation that the 
Constitution requires school districts to ignore the problem of de facto resegregation in 
schooling. I cannot endorse that conclusion. To the extent the plurality opinion suggests 
the Constitution mandates that state and local school authorities must accept the status 
quo of racial isolation in schools, it is, in my view, profoundly mistaken.”). 
 185. See supra note 1. 
 186. See supra note 2. 
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consistently command five votes.  Moreover, four (and at times 
five) members of the current Court are on record as rejecting the 
view that de facto segregation is constitutionally salient. For 
those members of the Court, an Article such as this is unlikely to 
affect their views. 
But at the same time, this Article has demonstrated that the 
Court’s view of segregation has not been monolithic; its view of 
de facto segregation has been less static and more nuanced that 
is commonly appreciated. As I have demonstrated, the Court has 
often viewed de facto segregation with deep suspicion. This 
theme or stand of equal protection jurisprudence is present, even 
if it does not represent the Court’s holding in every case. Given 
that, one argument is that the current Court should respect this 
skeptical approach to de facto segregation. That is, the Court 
should pay fealty to this tradition in equal protection, even if the 
Court is not strickly bound by it as a matter of stare decisis. At 
the very least, that Court should acknowledge this tradition 
before it discards it. Moreover, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in 
Parents Involved suggests that he may be open to this line of 
reasoning. Finally, this argument also provides ammunition for 
other members of the Court to attempt to persuade their 
colleagues when the Court revisits the question of affirmative 
action in higher education next term in Fisher v. University of 
Texas.187 
 
 
 187. 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 1652 (U.S. Feb. 21, 
2012) (No. 11-345). 
